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Abstract 
In Germany, there is currently a discussion about the implementation of penalty charges if 
firms refuse to offer apprenticeship training positions to school graduates. This paper aims at 
analyzing the policy instrument of penalty charges by a theoretical model that systematically 
compares its costs and benefits. Building on recent training literature, a two-period partial-
equilibrium model is designed that allows for worker heterogeneity in ability and covers 
special features of the German apprenticeship system. 
With respect to overall welfare, the implementation of penalty charges solves a trade-off. 
On the one hand, penalty charges increase the number of apprenticeship training positions 
and thus the fraction of trained workers in the workforce. On the other hand, some firms 
will leave the market to avoid the financial burden, which generates unemployment among 
workers with low ability. Altogether, we demonstrate that optimal penalty charges increase 
the overall welfare compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium if the productivity-enhancement 
of apprenticeship training exceeds some lower bound. 
Keywords 
Human Capital Formation, Apprenticeship Training, Inefficient Training Decision of Firms, 
Penalty Charges 
JEL Classification 
I28, J24, J31 1 Introduction
In Germany, there is currently a discussion about the implementation of penalty charges if ﬁrms refuse to
oﬀer apprenticeship training positions to school graduates. The German apprenticeship system provides
basic skills to a large share of the workforce and is thus considered an exemplary model for vocational
education (Harhoﬀ and Kane (1997)).1 But in the last several years, there are more and more youths
unable to ﬁnd apprenticeship training positions, who therefore remain unskilled after graduation.2 Many
ﬁrms decide not to oﬀer training places because trained workers can freely choose to change their employer
upon completion of their apprenticeship.3 These ﬁrms perceive the danger of bearing the costs of training
without getting any return. In consequence, the famous German apprenticeship system is challenged by
unemployment among young workers and an increasing number of unskilled workers.
In order to approach the problem of missing apprenticeship training positions, a compulsory training
quota for each ﬁrm is proposed depending on the number of full-time workers. If a ﬁrm does not satisfy
this quota, it has to pay a previously deﬁned penalty for each training place lacking to meet the quota.
Unfortunately, a theoretical analysis of penalty charges is still lacking. Our paper aims at closing this
gap by presenting a two-period partial-equilibrium model that systematically compares the costs and
beneﬁts of penalty charges. In the literature, there are two theoretical explanations for ﬁrms providing
general training at the intensive margin. First, the basic approach of Becker (1964) concentrates on the
ﬁrms’ current incentives during the training period.4 If the training wage is low enough - i.e. the gap
between apprentice output and training wage is big enough - to compensate for the costs generated by
training activities, then ﬁrms decide to provide general training to their workers. Second, Acemoglu and
Pischke (1999b) point out the compression of the wage structure in imperfect labor markets.5 If workers
stay with the training ﬁrm after the apprenticeship has been completed, then the ﬁrms’ incentives are
with respect to future returns because they manage to skim a rent from the increased output of trained
workers.
According to Acemoglu and Pischke, the training decision of ﬁrms bears two diﬀerent kinds of inef-
ﬁciencies. First, ﬁrms take into account only their own gains from higher productivity and neglect the
gains for the workers through higher wages in the second period. Second, ﬁrms further underinvest in the
general human capital of their workers if there is a positive probability of separation after the training
period because ﬁrms do not take into account higher wages of workers and higher proﬁts of potential
employers in the future (Acemoglu (1997)). One policy measure to reduce these ineﬃciencies in the pro-
vision of general training at the intensive margin are ﬁring costs. Because the probability of separation is
decreased, ﬁrms invest more in the human capital of their workers.6 However, the number of separations
1In Germany, two thirds of the age-group from 15 to 24 are provided with vocational training through the apprenticeship
system (BMBF (2004)).
2From 1991 to 2003, the number of new apprenticeship contracts has decreased from 571,206 to 564,493. Hence, the
number of registered apprenticeships has decreased from 1,629,312 to 1,581,629 (BMBF (2004)).
3In 2002, only 31.3% of all ﬁrms were providing apprenticeship training positions (BMBF (2004)).
4Cf. also Becker (1962).
5Cf. also Acemoglu (1997), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998a), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998b) and Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999a).
6The empirical evidence shows a positive relationship between training and job tenure (Lynch (1991) and Loewenstein
and Spletzer (1999)).
3is also decreased and could be ineﬃciently low. The total eﬀect of ﬁring costs on unemployment is am-
biguous because fewer separations lead to lower unemployment but some ﬁrms decide to leave the market
and thus it becomes harder to ﬁnd a job for unemployed workers (Belot, Boone, and Ours (2002)).7
In this paper, our formal analysis of penalty charges is based on the recent training literature with
oligopsonistic labor markets, but is extended in two important ways. First, our model allows for worker
heterogeneity in ability and manages to explain the extensive training decision of ﬁrms depending on
the individual ability of workers. Only those workers above some critical level of individual ability are
oﬀered an apprenticeship training position while workers with low ability remain unskilled. Second, we
bring together the two theoretical explanations of ﬁrm-sponsored general training in the context of the
institutional setting of the German apprenticeship system which is characterized by a ﬁxed training wage
and a prescribed length of the apprenticeship. Hence, in contrast to Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick
(2003), who concentrate on the regulation of apprenticeship contracts, these two parameters are not
determined endogenously. We will demonstrate that the ﬁrms’ incentives to provide apprenticeship
training are with respect to both current and future incentives. In other words, ﬁrms may provide
general training both because they are looking forward to future returns and because they currently
beneﬁt from doing so. Consequently, ineﬃciencies in the training decision result from the interaction of
ﬁrms and workers during the training period as well as during the working period. Beyond Acemoglu and
Pischke (1999b), our analysis indicates a third kind of ineﬃciency generated by the ﬁxed training wage
during the apprenticeship. This training wage determines the ﬁrms’ costs of apprenticeship training and
thus splits the workforce into apprentices and unskilled workers.
With respect to overall welfare, the implementation of penalty charges solves a trade-oﬀ. On the
one hand, penalty charges increase the number of apprenticeship training positions and thus the fraction
of trained workers in the workforce. On the other hand, some ﬁrms will leave the market to avoid the
ﬁnancial burden, which generates unemployment among workers with low ability. By also considering
administration costs of implementation, our formal analysis demonstrates that the optimal policy depends
on the productivity-enhancement of training. If the productivity-enhancement of apprenticeship training
is low, it is optimal to reject the implementation of penalty charges and the economy will attain the laissez-
faire equilibrium. However, optimal penalty charges increase the overall welfare if the enhancement in
productivity exceeds some lower bound. Quite intuitively, optimal penalty charges are decreasing in the
level of administration costs. Even if administration costs are very low, optimal penalty charges are
bounded above by some critical value that maximizes the number of apprenticeship training positions at
the cost of suppressed regular work. With welfare maximizing penalty charges, optimal overall welfare
depends positively on the productivity-enhancement of apprenticeship training and negatively on the
exogenous probability of separation after the apprenticeship has been completed.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section discusses human capital theory and its two approaches
to ﬁrm-sponsored human capital formation. After this, the institutional setting of the German appren-
ticeship system is illustrated. In sections 4 of this paper, our partial-equilibrium model is developed and
7The empirical evidence is mixed. Scarpetta (1996) and Elmeskov, Marint, and Scarpetta (1998) indeed ﬁnd a negative
correlation between ﬁring costs and unemployment whereas Nickell (1998) does not.
4the equilibrium without penalty charges is presented. In section 5, the implementation of penalty charges
is analyzed and optimal penalty charges are derived. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Theory of Firm-Sponsored Human Capital Formation
"Human capital" can be deﬁned as knowledge, skills, attitudes, aptitudes, and other acquired traits
contributing to production (Goode (1959)). According to Blundell, Dearden, Meghir, and Sianesi (1999),
there are two main components of human capital with strong complementarity: early ability (whether
acquired or innate) and skills acquired through formal education or training on the job. An extensive
review of the theory of human capital is given by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
2.1 The Basic Approach with Perfect Labor Markets
In his original model, Becker (1964) distinguishes between general and speciﬁc human capital. General
human capital is deﬁned to be not only useful with the current employer but also with other potential
employers. In contrast, speciﬁc human capital increases the productivity of the worker only in his current
job.8 Hence, in competitive labor markets, where workers receive wages equal to their marginal product,
ﬁrms cannot recoup investments in general skills, so that they refuse to pay for general training. How-
ever, workers themselves have the right incentives to invest in general human capital because they are
the sole beneﬁciaries of their improved productivity (either with their current or with future employers).9
Furthermore, workers can ﬁnance such investments quite easily by accepting a wage below their produc-
tivity during the period of training (the wage may even be negative) (Becker (1962)). For example, this
argument can be applied to apprenticeship systems in earlier centuries, where apprentices often paid fees
or worked for very low wages until they mastered a certain grade (Hamilton (1996)).10 If workers are
not credit constrained, they eﬃciently invest in the accumulation of general human capital. On the other
hand, Becker (1964) argues that training in speciﬁc skills is quite diﬀerent because workers do not beneﬁt
from higher productivity after changing their jobs. Therefore, ﬁrms can recoup investments in speciﬁc
skills and are thus willing to share some of the costs of these investments. By also sharing the returns,
the accumulation of speciﬁc human capital leads to lower ﬂuctuations because both ﬁrms and workers
beneﬁt from keeping their contractual partner.
The empirical evidence of the model by Becker (1964) is mixed. On the one hand, it is supported
by the empirical analysis of Veum (1999). By using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY), he ﬁnds that ﬁrm-sponsored training is indeed negatively related to starting wages, but
positively related to wage growth. On the other hand, many analyses question the validity of Becker’s
explanation by showing that there are investments in general human capital which are ﬁnanced by the
employer. For example, by further analyzing data from the NLSY, Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) ﬁnd
8Parsons (1974) notes that this ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital is analytically equivalent to transfer costs for adjusting a
worker to other ﬁrms.
9Already Eckaus (1963) criticizes that these results strictly depend on the assumption of perfect labor markets.
10The relevance of this argument for the German apprenticeship system is explained in section 3.2.
5that the bigger part of ﬁrm-sponsored training is general. Other empirical studies also show that ﬁrms
bear substantial net costs in providing general training to their apprentices. For example, Ryan (1980)
examines welder apprentices in the US and Jones (1986) analyzes apprentices in British manufacturing.11
A number of studies also investigate whether workers taking part in general training programs pay for
the costs by accepting lower wages. The majority of these studies do not ﬁnd evidence of lower wages,
at least not in an appropriate amount to fully compensate ﬁrms for the costs. An overview about these
results is given by Bishop (1997). Hence, in contradiction to the theory of Becker (1964), there is at least
some empirical evidence of ﬁrm-sponsored investments in the general human capital of their employees.
2.2 Imperfect Labor Markets
In order to give a theoretical explanation for the empirical ﬁndings cited above, Acemoglu and Pischke
(1998a) develop a model with two periods, a training period where workers have identical productivity
zero and may receive an amount of general training t at costs c(t), and a second period where workers have
individual productivity f (t) and earn a wage w(t). If the labor market is competitive and workers are
not credit constrained, then the results of Becker (1964) hold: ﬁrms do not invest in general training and
workers invest eﬃciently by equating marginal returns and marginal costs of their investment: f′ (t∗) =
c′ (t∗). However, if labor market are not competitive or there are other labor market frictions which
generate wage compression, the worker’s wage is below his marginal product (Masters (1998)). Hence,
ﬁrms manage to skim labor market rents depending on the amount of training. Due to the compression of
the wage structure general skills are turned into de facto speciﬁc skills. Formally, Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999b) express this by assuming f (t) = w(t)+△(t). Hence, the wage function is increasing in the level
of training less steeply than productivity (i.e. the wage structure is compressed), so that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt,
equal to the positive gap △(t) between productivity and wage, has a ﬁrst derivative greater than zero.
As a consequence, ﬁrms prefer more skilled workers to less skilled ones and invest in general training until
the desired level of training satisﬁes △′  
tf 
= c′  
tf 
(cf. ﬁgure 1).
There are several possible sources of labor market imperfections. One possible source of wage com-
pression is the presence of transaction costs, for example due to matching and search frictions. The costs
of ﬁnding new contractual partners create a match-speciﬁc surplus that has to be shared by bargaining.
The bargaining process in this oligopsonistic labor market generates proﬁts equal to the Nash bargaining
solution △(t) = (1 − β)f (t) (Acemoglu (1997)). Furthermore, wage compression may arise due to the
interaction of general and speciﬁc skills. If general and speciﬁc skills are complements in the production
of output, the presence of speciﬁc skills increases the productivity of general human capital. On the
other hand, the value of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills increases when general skills are acquired (Acemoglu and
Pischke (1999b)). Kessler and Luelfesmann (2002) as well as Balmaceda (2001) extend this idea by con-
structing a model with general and speciﬁc skills that constitute strategic complements although returns
and costs are technologically disconnected. They ﬁnd that - even in frictionless labor markets - there is
ﬁrm-sponsored general training because the hold-up problem of investment in general skills is reduced.
11The costs of apprenticeship training in Germany are discussed in section 3.3.
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Figure 1: Training with Compressed Wage Structure
According to Bougheas and Georgellis (2004), this interaction of general and speciﬁc skills is the reason
for German ﬁrms to oﬀer apprenticeship training positions although training is largely general.
A third source of wage compression is the presence of asymmetric information between the current
employer and other potential employers. There are two types of asymmetric information. The ﬁrst
concerns the amount of training the worker has received and is analyzed by Chang and Wang (1996).
If potential employers cannot observe the correct productivity and thus pay a wage below the marginal
product, the wage structure is compressed. With respect to the German apprenticeship system, this
explanation for ﬁrm-sposored general training seems less important because the apprenticeship follows a
prescribed curriculum.12 A further possible asymmetry between current and potential employers is about
innate ability of the worker (hidden knowledge), i.e. the employer learns about the ability of the worker
by providing general training (Acemoglu and Pischke (1998b)). A fourth reason for wage compression
is the presence of asymmetric information between worker and current employer concerning the worker’s
eﬀort (hidden action). Hence, wages must satisfy the incentice compatibility constraints which leads to
a compressed wage structure (Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b)). In a similar model, Loewenstein and
Spletzer (1998) demonstrate that eﬃciency wages (that are paid to reduce ﬂuctuations) can also induce
ﬁrms to pay for general training. Many authors have investigated similar sources of ﬁrm-sponsored
general training. For example, Bishop (1997) and Lazear (2003) point out that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc mixture
of general skills makes the labor market non-competitive. Wage compression can also be generated by
labor market institutions, for example minimum wages (Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a)) and worker
unionization (Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984)).
Regarding the empirical evidence, Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) ﬁnd that general training raises
future wages more for workers changing their job than for workers remaining with the employer initially
providing the training. This result is consistent with workers and employers sharing the returns to
12Cf. the description of the German apprenticeship system in section 3.2.
7general training. Furthermore, Brunello (2002) suggests that wage compression and the amount of general
training show a positive and signiﬁcant correlation.
2.3 Regulation of Apprenticeship Contracts
In their recent approach to ﬁrm-sponsored human capital formation, Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick
(2003) focus on the regulation of apprenticeship contracts. The apprenticeship contract is assumed to
specify the length of the apprenticeship and the training wage. Because workers earn a wage equal to
their marginal product after having completed the apprenticeship, the training wage must be suﬃciently
low in order to initiate ﬁrms to provide apprenticeship training. The optimal length of the apprenticeship
solves a trade-oﬀ between between current returns for the training ﬁrm during the apprenticeship and
future returns for all potential employers after the apprenticeship. It determines the amount of training
provided for each apprentice. Depending on this optimal amount of training, the number of training
ﬁrms is determined by ﬁxed costs of training that are diﬀerent for each ﬁrm. Malcomson, Maw, and
McCormick (2003) show that regulation to increase the length of the apprenticeship, combined with a
subsidy for each completed apprenticeship if the eﬃciency loss from distortionary taxation to ﬁnance
the subsidy is suﬃciently low, can increase the number of apprentices and the amount of training per
apprentice. In our model, we will concentrate on the training decision at the extensive margin in order
to analyze ineﬃciencies in the number of apprenticeship training positions.
3 The German Apprenticeship System
3.1 Historical Relevance of Apprenticeship Training
Historically, there have been several characteristics of apprenticeship training. First, the length of the
apprenticeship was speciﬁed contractually in advance and independent of individual ability. For example,
this applied to the métier in France, arte in Italy, craft guild in England, and Zunft or Innung in Germany.
Second, apprenticeship training has been intensely regulated, for example by guilds in medieval times.
This regulation typically implied a minimum duration of apprenticeships and the control of adequacy of
training. The craft guilds of the middle ages had supervisory functions that included the right of search
to insure that good materials and appropriate processes of manufacture were employed. In Germany,
a range of institutions funded collectively by ﬁrms controlled the working of the apprenticeship system
(Pirenne (1936)).
3.2 Institutional Setting of the German Apprenticeship System
The educational system of Germany is one of the most segregated among industrialized countries. There
are four types of German secondary schools: lower (Hauptschule), middle (Realschule), upper (Gymna-
sium), and mixed (Gesamtschule). Upon their conclusion, all of these school tracks require the successful
8completion of exams which indicate whether students are qualiﬁed to enter into an apprenticeship, other
vocational training, or the university (Cooke (2003)).
Apprenticeship training can be undertaken in a variety of skilled blue or white collar positions. It
combines part-time schooling with a work-based component (the so-called "dual system") and is largely
general. Firms oﬀering apprenticeship training positions have to follow a prescribed curriculum and
apprentices take a rigorous exam at the end of the apprenticeship. Industry or craft chambers certify
whether ﬁrms fulﬁll the requirements to train apprentices adequately, while worker councils in the ﬁrms
monitor the training. During the apprenticeship, workers receive a low training wage independent of
their individual productivity. This training wage is set by negotiation of the collective bargaining parties.
After having passed the exam, apprentices receive a formal skill certiﬁcate that is accepted nationwide
(Bougheas and Georgellis (2004)).13
3.3 Costs of Apprenticeship Training in Germany
In 1991, the Bundesanstalt für Berufsbildung investigated training ﬁrms with respect to their accounting
costs and apprentice productivity in order to assess the net costs of training which are deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between gross costs and apprentice output. The results of this study are described in Von-
Bardeleben, Beicht, and Fehér (1995). The ﬁrst step is to calculate gross costs as the sum of payroll
costs, training personnel, material, equipment, and structures used in the training as well as direct costs
of any external training. However, in many ﬁrms trainers are not engaged in training full-time but also
work in productive activities. The German study for 1991 takes two approaches to this problem. The
ﬁrst is to prorate time spent on training by part-time personnel (A). The second is to exclude the costs
of part-time trainers completely from the calculation of costs (B). The latter approach serves as a lower
bound for the training costs born by the ﬁrms.
In a second step, the output of apprentices is estimated. A measure of output is designed by multi-
plying time spent in productive activities by payroll costs of a skilled worker and the relative eﬃciency
of apprentices (C).14 However, this calculation implicitly assumes that wages of skilled workers are set
competitively and reﬂect marginal product. If the labor markets are not perfect, the marginal product
may exceed wages so that the output of apprentices is underestimated. For this reason, an alternative
measure of apprentice output is constructed by assuming imperfect labor markets with a markdown of
50% (2C).15 Table 1 illustrates the role of these assumptions using data from VonBardeleben, Beicht,
and Fehér (1995) for Germany.
It is evident that at least large ﬁrms bear signiﬁcant costs in providing general training to their
apprentices. As a consequence, many ﬁrms do not oﬀer apprenticeship training positions in order to
avoid this ﬁnancial burden. However, at least for small and middle-sized ﬁrms, there may be net beneﬁts
from apprenticeship training depending on the method of calculating training costs and apprentice output.
13The German system of apprenticeship training is described e.g. by Soskice (1994) and Harhoﬀ and Kane (1995).
14Note that the fraction of time spent in productive activities corresponds to the parameter χ in our formal analysis (cf.
section 4.1).
15Note that this markdown of 50% corresponds to a worker’s bargaining share of β = 1
2 in our formal analysis (cf. section
4.1).
9All ﬁrms Firm size (number of employees)
0 - 9 10 - 49 50 - 499 500 +
1) Costs (A) 29,573 27,473 28,176 30,344 35,692
2) Costs (B) 18,051 13,867 15,074 20,283 28,197
Perfect Markets
Apprentice Output (C) 11,711 12,221 11,465 12,099 10,311
1) Net costs (A − C) 17,862 15,252 16,711 18,245 25,381
2) Net costs (B − C) 6,340 1,646 3,609 8,184 17,886
Imperfect markets
Apprentice Output (2C) 23,422 24,442 22,930 24,198 20,622
1) Net costs (A − 2C) 6,151 3,031 5,246 6,146 15,070
2) Net costs (B − 2C) -5,371 -10,575 -7,856 -3,915 7,575
Table 1: The Costs of Apprenticeship Training in Germany
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Figure 2: Evolution over Time
4 The Model
We consider a discrete-time model with two types of agents, namely workers and ﬁrms. In line with
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998a), there are two periods, a training period (period 1) and a working period
(period 2). Production takes place in worker-ﬁrm pairs and no capital is needed. The initial ability of
workers is exogenously given.
At the beginning of period 1, each ﬁrm meets one worker whose individual ability is drawn randomly
from a distribution that is common knowledge. Firms and workers decide whether to engage in appren-
ticeship training, to produce with regular work or to stay in the market at all. Apprenticeship training
only takes place if both parties prefer it to regular work. If one of them does not agree, the worker is
employed regularly. In the second period, all workers are employed regularly, but only those workers have
increased productivity who were trained in period 1. In line with Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick
(2003), the two periods are connected by an exogenous separating probability ρ. Hence, the status of
period 1 is maintained in period 2 with probability (1 − ρ). Altogether, the economy evolves over time
as shown in ﬁgure 2.
In our model, ﬁrms may provide general training both because they are looking forward to future
returns in period 2 (as in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b)) and because they currently beneﬁt from doing
10so in the ﬁrst period (as in Becker (1964)). Especially the latter argument has to be considered in the
analysis of penalty charges because the implementation of penalty charges aﬀects the current training
decision by altering the opportunity costs of refusing to oﬀer apprenticeship training positions. The model
assumptions and the training decision of ﬁrms and workers are described in the following subsections.
4.1 Model Assumptions
At the beginning of period 1, workers diﬀer by their individual ability that is assumed to be uniformly
distributed on the interval [θL,θH].16 Firms can unambiguously observe the workers’ abilities.17 In line
with Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003) and Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003), the mass of
workers is normalized to unity by deﬁning θL ≡ 0 and θH ≡ 1. Hence, the cumulative distribution
function of individual abilities is F(θ) = θ.
In the second period, the productivity of all workers employed regularly in period 1 is unchanged.
For all trained workers, productivity increases to θ2 = (1 + α)θ. The parameter α > 0 represents the
productivity-enhancement of apprenticeship training: the higher θ, the higher is the absolute productivity
gain generated by the apprenticeship.18 We assume that the productivity-enhancement α is identical for
all trained workers. This asumption is motivated by the literature dealing with the training decision at
the intensive margin.19 On the other hand, the productivity of workers unemployed in period 1 is reduced
to θ2 = (1 − σ)θ because a fraction σ > 0 of skills not employed in period 1 is lost and thus no longer
available in period 2.20
In line with Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003), workers are risk-neutral and maximize their
16This heterogeneity of workers is an important extension compared to the model by Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick
(2003). The continuous distribution of abilities allows to obtain a smooth participation decision at the individual level.
Mincer (1958) and Becker (1962) assume that abilities are normally distributed. Without changing the general results, we
assume a uniform distribution of abilities in order to keep the following calculations as simple as possible.
17This assumption is in line with Boone and Bovenberg (2006). Furthermore, it is implicitly included into the whole
literature on human capital and the life-cycle of earnings. Each worker oﬀers his individual stock of human capital to the
ﬁrms and is rewarded by a rental price per unit of human capital. Hence, we rule out asymmetric information (hidden
knowledge) as source of wage compression as described in section 2.2. If the worker’s productivity were not observed by
the ﬁrm there would be adverse selection as modeled e.g. by de Meza and Webb (2001).
In Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003), the productivity of workers is hidden knowledge and learned by the current
employer during the apprenticeship. If the monitoring of the training process is perfect, the ex-post problem of hidden
knowledge would be solved (i.e. also potential future employers would learn the worker’s productivity).
18Formally, this means
∂(θ2−θ)
∂θ = α > 0. Intuitively, the accumulation of new skills is easier when more skills are already
available. This relationship is also suggested by Ben-Porath (1967) and Mincer (1997). Because the parameter α determines
productivity and thus the wage in period 2, it constitutes the key determinant of the return to education as analyzed in the
theory of human capital (Mincer (1974)).
19In conformity with the literature, we assume the productivity-enhancement unambiguously depending on the amount
of training. Because the optimal amount of training per apprentice is independent of θ, also the productivity-enhancement
α is independent of θ and thus identical for each worker. Formally, this characteristic is derived in appendix A.
In almost the same manner, Ben-Porath (1967) and Heckman (1976) assume that the absolute (and not the relative)
increase in human capital depends on the existing stock of human capital (which may be interpreted as initial ability).
20In line with Heckman (1976), the parameter σ describes the depreciation rate of skills.
11expected individual income over both periods:21
U (θ,θ2) = w(θ) + δE [w(θ2)] (1)
By assumption, the mass of ﬁrms is also one, so that each ﬁrm meets one worker whose ability is
uniformly distributed with θ ∼ u[0,1]. Firms are risk-neutral and maximize the sum of expected proﬁts
over both periods:
π(θ,θ2) = π(θ) + δE [π(θ2)] (2)
In both periods, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is equal to the diﬀerence between revenue and costs per worker.22 By
deﬁning the output good as numéraire and assuming an identical, linear one-to-one production function
for the connection of output and labor (which is the only factor of production), the proﬁt in each period
j depends on the worker’s productivity θj in the following manner:23
π(θj) = χWθj − w(θj) (3)
χW is a relative eﬃciency parameter of workers with χW = 1 for regular full-time workers and 0 <
χW = χ < 1 for apprentices. The parameter χ refers to the allocation of time between training and
work in the ﬁrst period and represents the fraction of time spent in productive activities.24 w(θj) is
the wage depending on the worker’s productivity in period j. If a workers is not trained, he can be
employed regularly and earns a wage corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution of oligopsonistic
labor markets, i.e. w(θj) = βθj. According to Acemoglu (1997), the parameter 0 < β < 1 indicates the
(identical) bargaining power of workers concerning the division of output. In the case of apprenticeship
training, the worker receives the training wage wA ≥ 0 that is identical and independent of productivity
for all apprentices.25
In period 2, the wage of all workers corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution. Hence, the proﬁt of
21The parameter δ expresses the preference for current and future welfare. The higher δ, the higher ist the weighting of
period 2 and the lower is the preference for period 1.
Note that the wage w(θ) corresponds to the income of the worker with individual ability θ because labor supply is
implicitly normalized to unity.
In line with Ben-Porath (1967), we do not analyze a more general utility function of workers. Models of human capital
accumulation over the life-cycle can be attributed to two diﬀerent branches: earnings maximizing models and utility
maximizing models. Earnings maximizing models abstract from the labor-leisure choice problem and only analyze the
trade-oﬀ between investment and income. Utility maximizing models also incorporate the labor-leisure choice so that labor
supply becomes endogenous to the model (for example Heckman (1976)).
22From the ﬁrm’s point of view, the worker’s ability can be interpreted as individual productivity.
23The production side is modeled like in Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003), i.e. the production function exhibits
constant returns to scale.
To hold calculations simple, we assume the ﬁxed costs of production to be zero. Without this assumption, our analytical
results in section 5 remain the same. The only diﬀerence is that there is unemployment also in the laissez-faire equilibrium
(cf. section 4.3).
24The reduced eﬃciency of apprentices is due to external schooling, internal seminars, et cetera (cf. section 3.3). Note
that the productivity-enhancement α unambiguously depends on χ. The higher χ, the lower the time spent for training
activities and the lower α. Because χ is no decision variable of the ﬁrm, we neglect this relationship in the following analysis.
25Cf. section 3.2. Note that the ﬁxed training wage analytically works like ﬁxed costs of apprenticeship training. There is
only one diﬀerence: with direct costs of apprenticeship training it would not be optimal to train all workers in the ﬁrst-best
optimum.
We restrict the training wage to satisfy wA ≤ χ − (1 − β). This assumption can be justiﬁed by economic intuition: the
training wage should not exceed the diﬀerence between the output of the most productive apprentice and the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
by regularly employing the most productive worker. Because of wA ≥ 0 this restriction implies χ ≥ 1 − β.
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each ﬁrm in period 2 depends on the worker’s previous status of employment:26




(1 − β)(1 + α)θ if apprenticeship in t = 1
(1 − β)θ if regular work in t = 1





4.2 The First-Best Optimum
In the ﬁrst-best optimum, the total surplus of workers and ﬁrms is maximized. Overall welfare is equal
to the sum of the aggregate proﬁts of all ﬁrms and the aggregate utility of all workers over both periods.
Obviously, there is no unemployment because each unemployed worker would be equivalent to lost pro-
ductivity, i.e. uFB = 0. Each trained worker generates output equal to his productivity χθ during the
apprenticeship and (1 + α)θ after the apprenticeship has been completed. In the case of regular work,
each worker generates output θ in both periods.
In the following, we assume that θ
FB describes the welfare maximizing pivotal productivity between
apprenticeship training and regular work. Hence, the optimal number of apprentices in the ﬁrst period
is nFB = 1 − θ
FB. This situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. The overall welfare in the ﬁrst-best optimum






(χ + δ(1 + α))θdθ






      
regular work
(5)
In order to determine θ












Note that the overall welfare does not depend on θ
W because it is not optimal to employ workers regularly
if any worker with lower productivity is oﬀered an apprenticeship training position.
26The probability of a match in period 2 may explicitly depend on the worker’s status of employment in period 1. Diﬀerent
matching probabilities can be justiﬁed by diﬀerent frictions in searching for employment. Mincer (1989) empirically conﬁrms
that the probability of unemployment decreases with education. In this context, Brown and Kaufold (1988) stress that
the possibility of unemployment reduces expected returns to education. Hence, the return to education is based on higher
productivity as well as higher employment probability (Bloch and Smith (1977)). For simplicity, we assume no search
frictions and thus the same matching probability for all workers.
27Note that the density function of individual abilities is f (θ) = 1.








> 0 if α <
1−χ
δ







δ , overall welfare is strictly increasing in θ
FB and thus decreasing in the number of
apprenticeship training positions. Hence, overall welfare is maximal for θ
FB = 1, i.e. no workers should
be trained: nFB = 0. In this case, overall welfare is equal to WFB(1) = 1
2 (1 + δ).
For α ≥
1−χ
δ , overall welfare is decreasing in θ
FB. Therefore, overall welfare is maximal for θ
FB = 0
(i.e. nFB = 1), which means WFB(0) = 1
2(χ + δ(1 + α)). This corresponds to the product of average
ability of all workers and the discounted sum of all parameters inﬂuencing the total productivity of
apprentices in both periods. Both cases are summarized in the following proposition.28














4.3 The Benchmark without Penalty Charges
4.3.1 The Training Decision of Firms
At the extensive margin, each ﬁrm decides whether to oﬀer an apprenticeship training position, to employ
the worker regularly, or to leave the market. The ﬁrm only has this discrete choice but cannot decide
on the amount of general training provided to the worker at the intensive margin.29 The length of the
apprenticeship (which is equal to period 1) and the relative eﬃciency parameter χ do not constitute
decision variables of the ﬁrm.30
No ﬁrm will leave the market because it is always possible to make positive proﬁts by employing
the worker regularly. In the following, we will analyze the training decision of ﬁrms depending on the
individual abilities of workers. In this context, we deﬁne θ
LF to be the worker’s productivity that makes
a ﬁrm just indiﬀerent between apprenticeship training and regular work.
28The same result is obtained by considering the discounted sum of wages and proﬁts for a given productivity. The
additional surplus generated by a productivity θ with apprenticeship training is greater than with regular work if
χθ + δ (1 + α)θ ≥ (1 + δ)θ ⇔ v1θ ≥ 0 (8)
29This assumption is analytically equivalent to the implication that the amount of training provided at the intensive
margin is independent of the worker’s ability and thus identical for each ﬁrm. Formally, this assumption is justiﬁed in
appendix A.
30These assumptions are justiﬁed by the institutional features of the German apprenticeship system as described in
section 3. This is the main diﬀerence to the framework of Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003) where the length of
the apprenticeship is the key determinant of apprenticeship training. In their approach, ﬁrms choose the optimal amount
of general training depending on the length of the apprenticeship contract.
14Deﬁnition 1 The pivotal productivity θ
LF is deﬁned to be the lowest productivity that ﬁrms decide to
oﬀer an apprenticeship training position. A ﬁrm prefers apprenticeship training to regular work if its
proﬁts over both periods solve31
χθ − wA + δ(1 − ρ)(1 − β)(1 + α)θ + δρ(1 − β)E [θ2]
≥ (1 − β)θ + δ(1 − ρ)(1 − β)θ + δρ(1 − β)E [θ2]
⇔ θ ≥ θ
LF ≡
wA
χ − (1 − β) + δ(1 − ρ)(1 − β)α











The pivotal productivity θ
LF increases with the training wage (wA) and the separating probability
(ρ) and decreases with the relative eﬃciency of apprentices (χ) and the productivity-enhancement of
apprenticeship training (α). From the ﬁrms’ point of view, the optimal number of apprenticeship training
positions is equal to 1 − θ
LF.32
4.3.2 The Training Decision of Workers
Additionally, we have to analyze the training decision of workers. Note that workers never prefer to stay
unemployed because they receive zero income in this case.33 Workers prefer to be trained in period 1 if
the discounted sum of their expected earnings over both periods is bigger with apprenticeship training
than with regular work. Hence, the following participation constraint must be satisﬁed:
wA + δβ (1 + α)θ ≥ (1 + δ)βθ ⇔ β (−1 + δα)θ ≥ −wA (10)
Proposition 2 For α ≥ 1
δ, the participation constraint is satisﬁed for all abilities θ ∈ [0,1].34 However,
If the productivity-enhancement of apprenticeship training is low, workers with high productivity prefer to
remain unskilled. For α < 1




β (1 − δα)
(11)
The pivotal productivity θ
W is deﬁned to be the highest productivity that decides to accept an apprenticeship
training position if the productivity-enhancement of training is low.
If the productivity-enhancement of apprenticeship training exceeds the lower bound 1
δ, all workers
prefer apprenticeship training to regular work because their wages in period 2 increase by more than they
31The calculation would be more complicated if the probability of maintaining the status of period 1 or the matching
probability in period 2 depend on the status in the ﬁrst period.
32Note that 0 ≤ θLF ≤ 1 is implied by 0 ≤ wA ≤ χ − (1 − β).
33Note that there are no unemployment beneﬁts. If there were unemployment beneﬁts greater than zero, low-ability
workers may prefer to stay unemployed.
34In Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003), there is no worker heterogeneity in initial ability. In this case, incentice
compatibility means that the training wage must exceed some lower bound.
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Figure 4: The Laissez-Faire Equilibrium 1
have to forgo in the ﬁrst period. However, for α < 1
δ, only low-ability workers will adopt an apprenticeship
training position. Workers with individual ability above θ
W prefer to be employed regularly because the
productivity-enhancement in period 2 is too low to compensate for the low training wage in period 1.
4.3.3 The Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
In a ﬁrst step, we concentrate on the case α ≥ 1
δ, i.e. we assume that all workers prefer to receive
apprenticeship training. In the ﬁrst period, nLF = 1 − θ
LF workers are trained and earn the training
wage wA while all other workers are employed regularly and earn a wage equal to the Nash bargaining
solution, i.e. w(θ) = βθ. There is no unemployment because ﬁrms and workers always prefer regular
work to market exit. This situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 4. Hence, in the laissez-faire equilibrium (LF),












      
regular work
(12)
While the ﬁrst integral in equation (12) is equal to the aggregate wage sum of apprentices, the second
one describes the aggregate wage sum of regular workers.
In the second period, the productivity of trained workers is increased by the factor (1 + α). All
workers are employed regularly and the wages correspond to the Nash bargaining solution so that wages





β (1 + α)θdθ






      
unkilled work
(13)
The ﬁrst integral in equation (13) is equal to the aggregate wage sum of trained workers and the second
one describes the aggregate wage sum of unskilled workers. Hence, aggregate welfare of workers over both








[wA + δβ (1 + α)θ]dθ






      
unkilled work
16The ﬁrst integral is equal to the discounted aggregate wage sum of trained workers who earn wA in the
ﬁrst period and w(θ) = β (1 + α)θ in the second period. The second integral describes the discounted
aggregate wage sum of workers without apprenticeship training position.





















(1 − β)(1 + α)θdθ






      
unkilled work
(16)
In period 1, the ﬁrst integral is equal to the aggregate proﬁts of training ﬁrms. These proﬁts are deter-
mined by the eﬃciency parameter χ and the training wage wA. In period 2, the ﬁrst integral describes
the aggregate proﬁts of ﬁrms producing with a trained worker. These proﬁts correspond to the Nash bar-
gaining solution, i.e. the fraction (1 − β) determines the proﬁt of the ﬁrm. In both periods, the second
integral is equal to the aggregate proﬁts of ﬁrms employing unskilled workers regularly. In a nutshell, the








[(χ + δ(1 − β)(1 + α))θ − wA]dθ





(1 + δ)(1 − β)θdθ
      
unkilled work
Altogether, overall welfare is determined by the aggregate welfare of workers and the aggregate welfare
of ﬁrms as described by equations (14) and (17). Hence, overall welfare in the laissez-faire equilibrium
for α ≥ 1







(χ + δ (1 + α))θdθ










WLF = (1 − θ

















In equation (19), the integrals of equation (18) are calculated as the product of mass and average pro-
35Note that overall welfare in this case is very similar to equation (??). The only diﬀerence is the pivotal productivity
between apprenticeship training and regular work. θLF > θFB implies that the number of apprenticeship training positions




training(LF)          




work(LF)          
Figure 5: The Laissez-Faire Equilibrium 2
ductivity in the corresponding ability interval. Because individual abilities are uniformly distributed,
average productivity in the interval [θ
LF,1] is calculated by averaging the limit values of this interval:
1+θLF
2 . Note that the parameter β cancels out because the bargaining power only determines how the
output is divided between workers and ﬁrms.
In a second step, we have to analyze the laissez-faire equilibrium for α < 1
δ. In this case, all workers
with individual ability θ > θ
W prefer regular work to apprenticeship training. This situation is illustrated




δ, the pivotal productivity θ
W is greater than θ
LF.36 Hence, less workers are trained compared
to the case α ≥ 1
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Note that the labeling in equation (20) refers to the worker’s status of employment in period 1. If the
productivity-enhancement α is very small (i.e. α <
1−χ
δ(1−ρ(1−β))) the pivotal productivity θ
W is smaller
than θ
LF. Hence, there are no workers that both prefer apprenticeship training and are oﬀered a training




(1 + δ) (22)
The three diﬀerent cases of laissez-faire are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Depending on the productivity-enhancement α, overall welfare in the laissez-faire equi-















δ(1−ρ(1−β)) ≤ α < 1
δ
1
2 (χ + δ (1 + α)) − 1
2v1(θ










δ because χ > ρ(1 − β).
18In the following section, this outcome with laissez-faire will be compared to the ﬁrst-best optimum of
section 4.2 in order to evaluate the possibilites of welfare-enhancing government interventions.
4.4 Ineﬃciencies in the Training Decision of Firms
Comparing overall welfare in the laissez-faire equilibrium with the ﬁrst-best optimum shows that only
for α <
1−χ
δ the former is eﬃcient because it is equal to the ﬁrst-best optimum with no training. For
α ≥
1−χ
δ , the number of apprenticeship training positions n is ineﬃciently low.
Proposition 4 Depending on α, the deviation from the ﬁrst-best number of apprenticeship training po-
sitions is
△n = nLF − nFB =

    
    










LF − 1 if
1−χ
δ(1−ρ(1−β)) ≤ α < 1
δ
−θ
LF if α ≥ 1
δ

    
    
(24)
For α ≥ 1
δ, the deviation from the ﬁrst-best optimum is driven by the pivotal productivity θ
LF =
wA
χ−(1−β1)+δ(1−ρ)(1−β2)α which characterizes the training decision of ﬁrms. The higher θ
LF, the lower the
number of apprenticeship training positions nLF = 1−θ
LF and the larger the ineﬃciencies in the training
decision △n. Note that the ineﬃciencies become smaller if the productivity of trained workers in the
second period is increased (α).
Altogether, the training decision of ﬁrms bears three diﬀerent kinds of ineﬃciencies which are in
line with the results of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b). In order to distinguish between these diﬀerent
kinds of ineﬃciencies we label the workers’ bargaining power by an index for period 1 and period 2
respectively. First, ﬁrms take into account only their own gains from higher productivity and neglect
the gains for the workers by higher wages in the second period. Hence, ﬁrms in aggregate underinvest in
the workers’ human capital by oﬀering an insuﬃcient number of apprenticeship training positions. This
kind of ineﬃciency could only be eliminated if ﬁrms were the sole beneﬁciaries of apprenticeship training
by choosing β2 = 0 and thus ruling out any bargaining power of workers in period 2. The higher the
bargaining power of workers in the second period, the higher the pivotal productivity θ
LF and the larger
the diﬀerence to the number of apprenticeship training positions in the ﬁrst-best optimum. The second
kind of ineﬃciency stems from the fact that there is a positive probability of (exogenous) separation
after the ﬁrst period. The pivotal productivity θ
LF is increasing in ρ because the ﬁrm bears the risk
of not participating in the worker’s higher productivity after the apprenticeship has been completed.
Hence, the training ﬁrm does not take into account higher proﬁts of potential future employers in period
2. The higher the separating probability after period 1, the larger the ineﬃciency in the provision of
apprenticeship training. This kind of ineﬃciency could only be eliminated if there were no exogenous
separation after the ﬁrst period (ρ = 0) or if future employers could be identiﬁed in advance and included
in the apprenticeship contract at the beginning of period 1.
19Beyond the approach of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b), our model covers a third source of ineﬃciency
that is generated by the ﬁxed training wage during the apprenticeship. Firms consider the training wage
as costs of providing apprenticeship training but do not take into account that it is also equivalent to
the income of apprentices in period 1. Hence, θ
LF is increasing in wA. From the point of view of policy
analysis, this is an interesting feature of the training decision of ﬁrms because the government can reduce
this ineﬃciency by regulating the training wage towards zero. For example, the government can move
the training wage towards zero by statutorily lowering the bargaining power of the unions.37 However,
the ﬁrst-best optimum is only achieved for wA = 0. Otherwise, all ﬁrms with a negative proﬁt would
rather leave the market.38
Proposition 5 Depending on α, the ineﬃcient low number of apprenticeship training positions yields
the following welfare deviation from the ﬁrst-best optimum:
△W =

    
    




2 (χ − 1 + δα) ≤ 0 if
1−χ




2 (χ − 1 + δα) + 1
2v1[(θ
W)2 − (θ
LF)2] < 0 if
1−χ




LF)2 < 0 if α ≥ 1
δ

    
    
(25)
The ineﬃciencies in the training decision constitute the necessary condition for welfare-enhancing
government interventions. Penalty charges are one possible policy instrument to move the economy
towards its ﬁrst-best optimum by reducing the third kind of ineﬃciency and thus increasing the number
of apprenticeship training positions. The welfare implications of penalty charges are analyzed in the
following section.
5 The Welfare Analysis of Penalty Charges
5.1 The Pivotal Productivities with Penalty Charges
If identical penalty charges T ≥ 0 are imposed in the case of regular work, the opportunity costs of
refusing to oﬀer apprenticeship training positions are increased.39 Hence, the pivotal productivity between
apprenticeship training and regular work is decreased.
Deﬁnition 2 The pivotal productivity θ
PC
A is deﬁned to be the lowest productivity that ﬁrms decide to
oﬀer an apprenticeship training position if they are exposed to penalty charges. With penalty charges, a
37Note that the productivity-enhancement of apprenticeship training must be high enough to satisfy the participation
constraint of workers (cf. section 4.3.2).
38The ﬁrst-best optimum would also be achieved if it were possible to compensate ﬁrms for their losses. However, we
assume that this policy instrument is not available.
39The training quota for the identical ﬁrms is one, i.e. every ﬁrm is assigned to train the worker it meets. Consequently,
the penalty charges are identical for each untrained worker. Note that penalty charges are analytically the same as ﬁxed
costs of production that only accrue in the case of regular work.
20ﬁrm prefers apprenticeship training to regular work if its proﬁts over both periods solve





χ − (1 − β) + δ(1 − ρ)(1 − β)α
With respect to θ
PC
A , penalty charges work like a reduction in the training wage. However, with
penalty charges it could be beneﬁcial for ﬁrms to leave the market in period 1 (with zero proﬁts) and
reenter in period 2 in order to avoid the unproﬁtable apprenticeship or the ﬁnancial burden of penalty
charges, respectively.40 Hence, all workers below the pivotal productivity θ
PC
U stay unemployed in period
1.
Deﬁnition 3 The pivotal productivity θ
PC
U is deﬁned to be the lowest productivity that ﬁrms decide to
employ regularly compared to zero proﬁts in the case of market exit. With penalty charges, a ﬁrm prefers
regular work to market exit if its proﬁts over both periods solve





(1 − β)(1 + δ(1 − ρ))












LF, the pivotal productivity θ
PC
A is increasing in ρ (i.e. there are less apprenticeship training
positions) because separation becomes more likely and thus the expected return to apprenticeship training
is reduced for the training ﬁrm. In the same way, θ
PC
U is increasing in ρ (i.e. there are more workers
unemployed) because it becomes less proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to pay the penalty charges and retain a
regular worker.
40If ﬁrms are bared from reentering in period 2, the welfare losses due to penalty charges would be more complicated. On
the one hand, welfare would decrease because of missing employment places in period 2. On the other hand, the number of
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Figure 6: The Equilibrium with Penalty Charges






U ≥ 0 (29)
This relationship is implied by the penalty charges satisfying T ≤ ¯ T ≡
(1−β)(1+δ(1−ρ))
χ+δ(1−ρ)(1−β)(1+α)wA.
Altogether, nPC = 1−θ
PC




additional apprenticeship training positions compared to the laissez-faire equilibrium. All workers with




U are employed regularly while all workers with ability below θ
PC
U
stay unemployed. This situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 6.
5.2 The Equilibrium with Penalty Charges
With penalty charges, there is an increased number of apprenticeship training positions. On the other
hand, there is unemployment among low-ability workers because ﬁrms prefer market exit to regular work.






[wA + δβ (1 + α)θ]dθ















δβ (1 − σ)θdθ
      
unemployment
41Assume that ˙ θ is deﬁned to be the pivotal productivity between apprenticeship training and market exit:
˙ θ =
wA
χ + δ (1 − ρ)(1 − β)(1 + α)
(27)
˙ θ lies between θPC
A and θPC
U (cf. appendix B) and thus has no impact on the labor market outcome.
Note that with respect to the relationship of the pivotal productivities there is a second case which is mathematically
feasible:
1 ≥ θLF ≥ θPC
U > ˙ θ > θPC
A or θPC
U > θLF > ˙ θ > θPC
A if T > ¯ T (28)
In this case (II), penalty charges would have to satisfy T > ¯ T . Intuitively, ¯ T maximizes the number of apprenticeship
training positions at the cost of suppressed regular work. If the administration costs of penalty charges exceed some lower
bound, this second case never accrues in the optimum (cf. appendix C.2) so that we can neglect it. In more detail, case
(II) is presented in appendix D. The formal proof why only these two cases are feasible is shown in appendix B.
22The ﬁrst integral is equal to the discounted aggregate wage sum of trained workers who earn wA in
period 1 and w(θ) = β(1+α)θ in period 2. The second integral in equation (30) describes the discounted
aggregate wage sum of workers who are employed regularly in both periods. And the third integral is
equal to the discounted aggregate wage sum of low-ability workers who are employed regularly in period
2 but stay unemployed in the ﬁrst period. Note that all workers with θ < θ
PC
U earn nothing in period 1.
In the second period, there is no unemployment. All workers are employed regularly and compensated
according to the Nash bargaining solution.





U ﬁrms that employ workers regularly in period 1. Hence, compared to the laissez-faire
equilibrium, the proﬁts of ﬁrms with regular work are reduced by T. In consequence, all ﬁrms that meet
a worker with productivity below θ
PC
U decide to leave the market and thus make zero proﬁts in period 1.
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δ(1 − β)(1 − σ)θdθ
      
unemployment
The ﬁrst integral in equation (31) is equal to the discounted aggregate proﬁts of training ﬁrms (period 1)
and ﬁrms meeting a trained worker (period 2), respectively. The second integral describes the discounted
aggregate proﬁts of ﬁrms that decide to employ workers regularly in both periods. And the third integral
is equal to the discounted aggregate proﬁts of those ﬁrms that meet low-ability workers in period 2. In
the second period, the proﬁts of all ﬁrms correspond to the Nash bargaining solution.
In order to calculate the overall welfare with penalty charges we have to consider the total amount of
penalty charges which is not lost but may be spent for the provision of public goods. Hence, we have to





Tdθ in the overall welfare equation (34). Unfortunately, the im-
plementation of penalty charges causes administration costs C (T). We assume that these administration




T2 with C′ (T) > 0 ; C′′ (T) > 0 (33)
Administration costs are increasing in T because ﬁrms try to reduce their training costs by lowering their
compulsory training quota. This eﬀort is assumed to increase disproportionately in the level of penalty
charges. Furthermore, public spending has to be ﬁnanced by distortionary taxation which generates
42As mentioned above, we assume the cost parameter c to exceed some lower bound (cf. appendix C.2):
c ≥ ¯ c ≡
1 − (1 − ρ)(1 − δ (1 − σ))
(1 − ρ)(v4)2 (1 + λ)
(32)
Without changing our results in general, this assumption guarantees T∗ ≤ ¯ T. In appendix D.1, the case c < ¯ c is discussed
in detail.
23eﬃciency losses of λ per unit of money. Altogether, the overall welfare with penalty charges is equal to
WPC(T) = WPC
W + WPC
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With respect to overall welfare, the implementation of penalty charges solves a trade-oﬀ. On the one
hand, penalty charges are welfare-enhancing because they increase the number of apprenticeship training
positions and thus the fraction of skilled workers in the second period. Hence, there are higher wages
and higher proﬁts after the apprenticeship because the output is shared between worker and ﬁrm. On
the other hand, penalty charges are costly because some ﬁrms will leave the market so that there is
unemployment among workers with lowest ability. Additionally, the implementation of penalty charges
causes administration costs which have to be ﬁnanced by distortionary taxation.














      
more apprenticeship training positions






∂T       
more unemployment
+ (1 + λ)cT
      
administration costs
(36)
Note that the partial derivatives of the pivotal productivities have the following sign:
∂θPC
A
∂T < 0 and
∂θPC
U
∂T > 0. Hence, both sides of equation (36) are unambiguously positive. Equation (36) compares the
marginal beneﬁts (LHS) and the marginal costs (RHS) of an increase in T. On the one hand, the welfare





which generates additional productivity of (χ − 1 + δα) per unit of initial ability. On the other hand,
there are two negative welfare eﬀects which are represented by the RHS. First, the number of unemployed
workers is increased by
∂θPC
U
∂T which is equal to reduced productivity of (1 + δσ) per unit of initial ability.
Second, there are additional welfare losses of (1 + λ)cT due to the administration costs.
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Figure 7: Optimal Penalty Charges





2 + v2 (v3)
2wA (37)
with v1 ≡ (χ − 1 + δα), v2 ≡ 1 + (v4)
2 (1 + λ)c + δσ, v3 ≡ (χ − (1 − β) + δ(1 − ρ)(1 − β)α) and v4 =
(1 − β)(1 + δ (1 − ρ)). The optimal penalty charges have to satisfy 0 ≤ T∗ ≤ ¯ T. In order to guarantee
T∗ ≥ 0, α has to exceed
1−χ
δ . However, T∗ never reaches the upper limit ¯ T.44
Additionally, we have to consider the participation constraint of workers as explained in section
4.3.2. Although the overall welfare in the laissez-faire equilibrium deviates from the ﬁrst-best opti-
mum for α ≥
1−χ
δ (cf. equation (25)), the optimal penalty charges are greater than zero not until





δ .45 Hence, the implementation of penalty charges only increases the overall welfare if the par-
ticipation constraint is satisﬁed for a suﬃcient number of workers. These results are summarized in the
following proposition and illustrated in ﬁgure 7.
Proposition 7 Optimal penalty charges are equal to
Topt =
 
0 if α <
1−χ
δ(1−ρ(1−β))





The optimal level of penalty charges explicitly depends on the productivity-enhancement of appren-
ticeship training. If α is low, it is optimal to reject the implementation of penalty charges, i.e. it is optimal
to set Topt = 0. However, if α exceeds the critical level
1−χ
δ(1−ρ(1−β)) it is optimal to implement penalty
charges according to Topt = T∗. Note that even for very high administration costs there is some critical
level of productivity-enhancement which makes optimal penalty charges greater than zero. The imple-
mentation of penalty charges becomes more likely the lower the critical level of productivity-enhancement.
This critical level
1−χ
δ(1−ρ(1−β)) is decreasing in the relative eﬃciency of apprentices, the discount factor
and the bargaining power of workers. However, it is increasing in the separating probability after the
ﬁrst period.
43The calculation of T∗ is shown in appendix C.1. Note that T∗ describes a maximum because α > 0 guarantees that
the second derivative is negative, i.e.
∂2WPC(T)
∂T2 < 0.
44These considerations are presented in appendix C.2.
45Cf. appendix C.3.
25Proposition 8 For α ≥
1−χ




















For α ≤ α′, the optimal penalty charges are increasing in α because a greater productivity-enhancement
increases the beneﬁts of additional apprenticeship training positions. However, for high values of α the
opposite is true because ﬁrms already take into account the beneﬁts of trained workers in the second
period. On the other hand, T∗ is decreasing in σ because a greater depreciation of skills during unem-
ployment increases the welfare loss of higher unemployment. Furthermore, the optimal penalty charges
are increasing in ρ because ﬁrms consider future gains in productivity to a lesser extent. Hence, the
optimal penalty charges must go against this ineﬃciency by increasing the opportunity costs of regular
work. Quite intuitively, the optimal penalty charges are decreasing in c and λ because these parameters
deﬁne the costs of administration and distortion. For one of these two parameters going towards inﬁnity,
optimal penalty charges are converging to zero. Finally, the partial derivative of T∗ with respect to the
training wage is positive because penalty charges reduce the ineﬃciencies in the number of apprenticeship
training positions by aﬀecting θ
PC
A like a reduction in wA.
By substituting the optimal penalty charges (38) into equation (34) we obtain the optimal overall
welfare with penalty charges.
Proposition 9 With optimal penalty charges, the overall welfare is equal to47
(WPC)∗ =
 




2 (χ + δ (1 + α)) − 1
2
v1v2





Altogether, the overall welfare is increased by the implementation of penalty charges if the productivity-
enhancement exceeds some lower bound
1−χ
δ(1−ρ(1−β)) which guarantees that the participation constraint
is satisﬁed for a suﬃcient number of workers.
Proposition 10 For α ≥
1−χ
δ(1−ρ(1−β)), the comparative statics of the optimal overall welfare with penalty
46These partial derivatives are calculated in appendix C.4.
47The calculation is shown in appendix C.5.



















The eﬀects of the comparative statics operate via two channels. First, there is a direct eﬀect on
overall welfare which is identiﬁed by equation (35). Additionally, there is an indirect eﬀect because the
optimal penalty charges are altered according to equations (39) to (44). Altogether, the optimal overall
welfare is increasing in α because trained workers are more productive in period 2. On the other hand,
it is decreasing in σ because formerly unemployed workers have lower productivity in the second period.
Furthermore, (WPC)∗ is negatively aﬀected by the separating probability ρ and the training wage wA
because both higher ﬂuctuation and higher wage costs of apprentices lead to increased ineﬃciencies in
the provision of apprenticeship training positions. Finally, the optimal overall welfare is decreasing in c
and λ which determine the costs of penalty charges.
5.3 Individual Welfare Consequences
While the previous section analyzes the welfare consequences of penalty charges in aggregate, it is also
important to investigate the implications for diﬀerent groups of workers. High-ability workers are not
aﬀected because they are trained anyway.49 While workers with middle ability above average beneﬁt
from penalty charges because ﬁrms now oﬀer them apprenticeship training positions, low-ability workers
suﬀer from unemployment in period 1 and thus reduced wages in period 2. These diﬀerent implications
are summarized in table 2. In a nutshell, the increased number of apprenticeship training positions is
achieved at the costs of unemployment among workers with lowest ability.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a two-period partial-equilibrium model that systematically compares the costs and
beneﬁts of penalty charges. As discussed in section 2, there are two theoretical explanations in the
48These partial derivatives are calculated in appendix C.6.
49In a general-equilibrium analysis, also implications for skill prices would have to be considered.
27Worker Type Welfare Diﬀerence
Workers with low ability (0 ≤ θ < θ
PC
U ) −β (1 + δσ)θ < 0
Workers with ability below average (θ
PC
U ≤ θ < θ
PC
A ) ±0
Workers with ability above average (θ
PC
A ≤ θ < θ
LF) wA + β (−1 + δα)θ > 0
Workers with high ability (θ
LF ≤ θ ≤ 1) ±0
Table 2: Welfare Eﬀects for Workers Depending on Individual Ability
literature for ﬁrms providing general training. Our formal analysis is based on the recent training litera-
ture with oligopsonistic labor markets but the model is adaped to the German system of apprenticeship
training with a ﬁxed length of the apprenticeship and an identical training wage independent of individ-
ual productivity. Furthermore, the model incorporates worker heterogeneity in ability which allows to
analyze the welfare implications of penalty charges for diﬀerent groups of workers.
In the laissez-faire equilibrium, the training decision of ﬁrms bears three diﬀerent kinds of ineﬃciencies.
In consequence, the number of apprenticeship training positions is too low compared to the ﬁrst-best
optimum. In line with the results of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b), ﬁrms do not take into account the
beneﬁts from increased productivity accruing both for workers and other employers in the future. These
two ineﬃciencies are increasing in the bargaining power of workers and the separating probability after
the training period, respectively. In our model, there is a third kind of ineﬃciency in the number of
apprenticeship training positions which is generated by the ﬁxed training wage in period 1. However,
penalty charges can reduce this third kind of ineﬃciency and thus increase the number of apprenticeship
training positions. Hence, the implementation of penalty charges moves the economy towards its ﬁrst-best
optimum with respect to the labor market decision between apprenticeship training and regular work.
The formal analysis shows that the optimal policy depends on the productivity-enhancement of ap-
prenticeship training. If the increase in productivity due to an apprenticeship is low, it is optimal to
reject the implementation of penalty charges. In this case, the laissez-faire equilibrium corresponds to
the ﬁrst-best optimum. However, optimal penalty charges increase the overall welfare if the productivity-
enhancement exceeds some lower bound which guarantees that the participation constraint is satisﬁed
for a suﬃcient number of workers. This lower bound of productivity-enhancement is decreasing in the
relative eﬃciency of apprentices, the discount factor and the bargaining power of workers. However, it is
increasing in the separating probability after the ﬁrst period.
With respect to overall welfare, the implementation of penalty charges solves a trade-oﬀ. On the
one hand, penalty charges are welfare-enhancing because they increase the number of apprenticeship
training positions and thus the fraction of skilled workers in the working period. On the other hand,
penalty charges are costly because some ﬁrms will leave the market which generates unemployment among
workers with low ability. Additionally, the implementation of penalty charges causes administration costs
that have to be ﬁnanced by distortionary taxation.
The overall welfare with optimal penalty charges is increasing in the productivity-enhancement of
apprenticeship training. However, it is decreasing in the depreciation rate of skills during unemployment,
the separating probability after the training period, the eﬃciency loss of distortionary taxation, the level
28of administration costs, and the training wage. There are two groups of workers that are aﬀected by the
implementation of penalty charges. While workers with middle ability above average beneﬁt from penalty
charges because they now receive apprenticeship training, low-ability workers are hurt because they are
exposed to unemployment. The welfare of high-ability workers and of workers with middle-ability below
average remains unchanged.
In our model, the number of apprenticeship training positions and the number of unemployed workers
are endogenously determined depending on the individual ability of workers. This extension advances the
analysis of Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (2003), where the number of trained workers is determined
by some ﬁxed costs of training. Nevertheless, our model has been kept simple for expositional and
calculational reasons. For example, we assume a uniform distribution of abilities and do not explicitly
explain the process of collective wage setting for apprentices. However, the underlying insights into the
model presented here are reasonably robust to various types of generalization. Hence, they constitute a
promising basis for further research.
A The Productivity-Enhancement of Apprenticeship Training
The productivity-enhancement α is assumed to be identical for all trained workers because it unambigu-
ously depends on the amount of training t which is chosen by the training ﬁrms at the intensive margin.
Analytically, this training decision at the intensive margin is considered before investigating the ﬁrms’
decision at the extensive margin (i.e. whether to provide apprenticeship training, to oﬀer regular work,
or to leave the market). The parameters α ≡ α(t) with α′ (t) > 0 and χ ≡ χ(t) with χ′ (t) < 0 are
assumed to depend on the amount of training t. Each ﬁrm maximizes the discounted sum of its proﬁts
over both periods
π(θ,t) = χ(t)θ − wA + δ (1 − ρ)(1 − β)(1 + α(t))θ + δρ(1 − β)E [θ2] (A1)
Suppose that the impact of t on the expected productivity in period 2 is neglected. Hence, the optimal
amount of t is deﬁned by the FOC
χ′ (t)θ + δ(1 − ρ)(1 − β)α′ (t)θ = 0
δ(1 − ρ)(1 − β)α′ (t) = −χ′ (t) (A2)
While the LHS of equation (A2) describes the marginal return by an additional unit of t, the RHS deﬁnes
the marginal costs. The optimal amount of training t∗ per apprentice is independent of θ. This result
is also justiﬁed by economic intuition because the apprenticeship follows a prescribed curriculum (cf.
section 3.2). Therefore, also the productivity-enhancement α(t∗) is independent of θ and thus identical
for all workers.50
50Note that δ describes the relative weight of the second period so that we can interpret (1 − δ) as the length of the
apprenticeship. Because t∗ is decreasing in δ, it is increasing in (1 − δ). This is the main result of Malcomson, Maw, and
McCormick (2003): increasing the length of the apprenticeship by government regulation increases the optimal amount of
training at the intensive margin.
29This situation can be illustrated by an example. Suppose that the functional forms of the parameters
are α(t) = t and χ(t) = e−t. In this case, the FOC is equal to
δ(1 − ρ)(1 − β) = e−t (A3)
Solving for t yields the optimal amount of training
t∗ = −ln[δ(1 − ρ)(1 − β)] (A4)
Hence, the productivity of trained workers in period 2 is equal to
θ2 = (1 + α(t∗))θ = (1 − ln[δ(1 − ρ)(1 − β)])θ (A5)
In line with Ben-Porath (1967) and Heckman (1976), the stock of human capital in the second period (θ2)
is linearly depending on θ. However, the productivity-enhancement α is independent of the individual
ability θ.
B The Relationship of the Pivotal Productivities
With respect to the labor market decision of ﬁrms, the four pivotal productivities are the following (cf.









χ − (1 − β) + δ(1 − ρ)(1 − β)α
˙ θ =
wA





(1 − β)(1 + δ (1 − ρ))
By comparing these pivotal productivities we obtain the following relationships:
θ
LF > 0 ; θ
PC
A > 0 if T < wA ; ˙ θ ≥ 0 ; θ
PC
U ≥ 0 (B1)
θ
LF ≤ 1 ; θ
PC
A ≤ 1 ; ˙ θ < 1 ; θ
PC





LF > ˙ θ ; θ
LF ≥ (<)θ
PC
U if T ≤ (>)
(1 − β)(1 + δ (1 − ρ))




A ≥ (<)˙ θ if T ≤ (>)¯ T ≡
(1 − β)(1 + δ (1 − ρ))






U if T ≤ (>)¯ T ; ˙ θ ≥ (<)θ
PC
U if T ≤ (>)¯ T (B5)
30Combining these relationships yields three cases that are mathematically feasible:
(1) 1 ≥ θ
LF ≥ θ
PC
A ≥ ˙ θ ≥ θ
PC
U ≥ 0 if 0 ≤ T ≤ ¯ T (B6)
(2) 1 ≥ θ
LF ≥ θ
PC
U > ˙ θ > θ
PC
A if ¯ T < T ≤
(1 − β)(1 + δ (1 − ρ))





LF > ˙ θ > θ
PC
A if T >
(1 − β)(1 + δ (1 − ρ))
χ − (1 − β) + δ (1 − ρ)(1 − β)α
wA (B8)
With respect to our formal analysis, we only have to distinguish between the folowing two cases:
(I) 1 ≥ θ
LF ≥ θ
PC
A ≥ ˙ θ ≥ θ
PC
U ≥ 0 if 0 ≤ T ≤ ¯ T (B9)
(II) 1 ≥ θ
LF ≥ θ
PC





LF > ˙ θ > θ
PC
A if T > ¯ T (B10)
C The Optimal Penalty Charges
C.1 Calculation of Optimal Penalty Charges


























+ (1 + λ)cT
(χ − 1 + δα)
wA − T
(v3)
2 = (1 + δσ)
T
(v4)
2 + (1 + λ)cT
with v3 ≡ (χ − (1 − β) + δ (1 − ρ)(1 − β)α) and v4 ≡ (1 − β)(1 + δ(1 − ρ)).
From this we obtain
 





2 + (1 + λ)c
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2 + (1 + δσ)(v3)
2 + (v3)
2 (v4)







with v1 ≡ (χ − 1 + δα) and v2 ≡ (1 + (v4)
2 (1 + λ)c + δσ).





2 + (1 + δσ)(v3)
2 + (v3)
2 (v4)






2 + v2 (v3)
2wA (C1)
31C.2 Requirements for the Productivity-Enhancement
For the case 0 ≤ T ≤ ¯ T ≡
(1−β)(1+δ(1−ρ))
χ+δ(1−ρ)(1−β)(1+α)wA = v4
v3+v4wA, the optimal penalty charges are given by
equation (C1). Hence, T∗ has to satisfy the following two conditions in order to lie within the required
interval:















v1v3v4 ≤ v2 (v3)
2
δα[v4 − (1 − ρ)(1 − β)v2] ≤ (1 − x)v4 + (χ − (1 − β))v2
δ(1 − β)α[1 − (1 − ρ)(v2 − δ)] ≤ (1 − x)v4 + (χ − (1 − β))v2
We assume that administration costs exceed some lower bound
c ≥ ¯ c ≡
1 − (1 − ρ)(1 − δ(1 − σ))
(1 − ρ)(v4)
2 (1 + λ)
⇔ 1 − (1 − ρ)(v2 − δ) ≤ 0 (C3)
so that the inequality is satisﬁed for
α ≥ 0 (C4)





C.3 Optimal Penalty Charges if the Participation Constraint of Workers is
not Satisﬁed
The participation constraint of workers may not be satisﬁed if the productivity-emhancement of appren-
ticeship training is too low, i.e. if α < 1
δ (cf. section 4.3.2). With respect to the optimal penalty charges





δ(1−ρ(1−β)) ≤ α < 1
δ

























δ is implied by χ ≥ 1 − β.
32Because θ
W is independent of T, the optimal penalty charges are the same as in the standard case:




2 + v2 (v3)
2wA (C7)
Although workers with high ability refuse apprenticeship training, the overall welfare with T∗ is higher








































if v1 > 0 ⇔ α >
1−χ






A ⇔ α <
1−χ
δ(1−ρ(1−β)) ∧ T <
1−χ−δα(1−ρ(1−β))
2(1−δα) χ























LF ⇔ α <
1−χ
δ(1−ρ(1−β)) ∧ T ≥
1−χ−δα(1−ρ(1−β))
2(1−δα) χ
In case (c), the overall welfare is the same as in case (a). However, because T∗ is not feasible
(i.e. T∗ <
1−χ−δα(1−ρ(1−β))
2(1−δα) χ) it is optimal to choose Topt = 0 as suggested in case (b). Hence, the




(1 + δ) = WLF (C10)
Proposition 11 Altogether, the optimal penalty charges for α < 1
δ are equal to
Topt =
 











δ(1−ρ(1−β)), the overall welfare in the laissez-faire equilibrium is equal to WLF = 1
2 (1 + δ) (cf. equation
(23)).
33C.4 Comparative Statics of Optimal Penalty Charges
It is important to analyze in which way the optimal penalty charges are aﬀected by changes in the key
parameters of the model. For α ≥
1−χ
δ(1−ρ(1−β)), the comparative statics with respect to productivity-
enhancement, depreciation rate, separation probability, administration costs, eﬃciency loss, and training
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2 + v2 (v3)
2







2 + v2 (v3)
2 > 0 (C17)
34C.5 Overall Welfare with Optimal Penalty Charges
The optimal overall welfare with penalty charges is determined by substituting the optimal penalty




(χ + δ (1 + α)) −
1
2





























































































































2 + v2 (v3)
2(wA)2 (C18)
C.6 Comparative Statics of Optimal Overall Welfare
It is important to analyze in which way the overall welfare with optimal penalty charges is aﬀected
by changes in the key parameters of the model. The comparative statics with respect to productivity-
enhancement, depreciation rate, separating probability, training wage, administration costs, and eﬃciency






















2 + v2 (v3)











2 + v2 (v3)
2











2 + v2 (v3)
2






2 + v2 (v3)








4 (1 + λ)
 
v1 (v4)
2 + v2 (v3)
2











2 + v2 (v3)
2 2(wA)2 < 0 (C24)
D Case (II)
D.1 Relevance









LF > ˙ θ > θ
PC
A
Case (II) becomes relevant if the optimal penalty charges would exceed the critical level ¯ T (cf. apendix
C.2):





δ(1 − β)α[1 − (1 − ρ)(v2 − δ)] > (1 − x)v4 + (χ − (1 − β))v2
which is equivalent to
c < ¯ c ∧ α > α ¯ T ≡
(1 − x)v4 + (χ − (1 − β))v2
δ (1 − β)[1 − (1 − ρ)(v2 − δ)]
(D2)
D.2 Optimal Penalty Charges in Case (II)
High penalty charges with T > ¯ T imply that the number of apprenticeship training positions is maximized
because all workers with θ ≥ ˙ θ are trained. All other workers stay unemployed, i.e. no ﬁrm decides to
360 θ ɺ LF θ 1
apprenticeshiptraining(PCII)                  
unemployment (PCII)            
additionalapprenticeship
trainingpositions
              
PC
A θ
Figure 8: The Equilibrium with Penalty Charges in Case (II)




U .53 This situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 8. Hence, the





(χ + δ(1 + α))θdθ
      
apprenticeship training
+
  ˙ θ
0
δ (1 − σ)θdθ
      
regular work





(χ + δ(1 + α)) −
1
2
(χ + δ (α + σ)) ˙ θ
2




Proposition 12 In case (II), the optimal penalty charges have to be as small as possible because WPC(II)
is strictly decreasing in T. Hence, the optimal penalty charges in case (II) are equal to54
T∗




D.3 Optimal Penalty Charges in Both Cases
Taken together cases (I) and (II), the optimal level of penalty charges explicitly depends on the productivity-
enhancement of apprenticeship training and the level of administration costs. If α is very low, it is optimal
to reject the implementation of penalty charges, i.e. to set Topt = 0. However, if α exceeds the critical
level
1−χ
δ(1−ρ(1−β)) it is optimal to implement penalty charges according to Topt = T∗. Only if administra-
tion costs are low and α is very high (cf. condition (D2)), it is optimal to choose Topt = ¯ T. Note that the
optimal penalty charges are bounded above by ¯ T which maximizes the number of apprenticeship training
positions at the cost of suppressed regular work. The result for low administration costs is summarized
in the following proposition and illustrated in ﬁgure 9.
53Case (II) also implies that the number of unemployed workers is maximized. Note that the overall welfare is not
depending on θPC
U being smaller or greater than 1.
54Because case (II) becomes relevant only for T > ¯ T, the optimal penalty charges must be slightly bigger than ¯ T. However,
to simplify matters, we assume T∗
(II) = ¯ T.
37α 0 T α
opt T 0 =    
0 α
opt * T T =                 
opt T T =          
Figure 9: Optimal Penalty Charges in Case (II)










δ(1−ρ(1−β)) ≤ α ≤ α ¯ T
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